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ARGUMENT 
I. Rule 602-2-1.D as Interpreted and Applied by the Labor Commission is 
Contrary to Utah Law 
A. The Labor Commission Avoids the Core Issue of How the Labor 
Commission Improperly Interpreted and Applied the Administrative Rule 
Contrary to Utah Law and Instead Argues a Related Issue in the Abstract 
The Labor Commission does not address Barnard & Burk's first argument, that as 
required by Utah precedent, Petitioner Albert was fully informed of the nature of the 
affirmative defense found in Utah Code Section 34A-2-417. The Labor Commission also 
does not contest the well-accepted rule that Utah administrative pleadings are liberally 
construed, or the corollary principle that as long as a party to an administrative proceeding 
is reasonably apprised of the issues in controversy, the administrative pleading is sufficient. 
Pilcher v. Dep't of Social Servs.. 663 P.2d 450, 453 (Utah 1983). Instead, the Labor 
Commission attempts to deflect the court's attention from this core issue by arguing that 
irrespective of how the Commission improperly applied Rule R602-2-1 .D, the Commission 
was authorized to promulgate administrative rules and that Rule R602-2-1 .D is not contrary 
to the Utah Administrative Procedures Act in the abstract. 
1. The Labor Commission Misinterpreted and Misapplied Rule R602-
2-1.D Contrary to Utah Common Law and the Utah Administrative 
Procedures Act; the Statutory Defense was Adequately Pleaded 
Because Mr. Albert was Apprised of the Issue and not Misled 
Mr. Albert was fully informed of the statutory defense of Utah Code Section 34A-2-
417. This statutory defense was sufficiently pled because Mr. Albert was apprised of the 
1 
issue and not misled. The Labor Commission improperly interpreted and applied its own 
administrative rule contrary to longstanding Utah law—that administrative pleadings are 
liberally construed—and concluded that Barnard & Burk had not pled the statute with 
specificity, irrespective of the fact that Mr. Albert was fully apprised of the nature of the 
defense. 
Barnard & Burk's seventh affirmative defense references Section 34A-2-417: 
"Defendants affirmatively allege the applicant's claims are or may be barred or limited by 
the statutes of limitation and/or notice provisions contained in Utah Code Annotated § 34A-2 
et seq., § 34A-3 et seq. and § 35-1 et seq." While this, standing alone, fully informed Mr. 
Albert of the nature of the affirmative defense found in Section 34A-2-417, this is not the 
only pleading, fact, or circumstance which informed Mr. Albert of the statute of limitations 
defense. Seven months prior, Mr. Albert had been fully informed of the nature of the 
affirmative defense in Section 34A-2-417 by co-defendant Quality Plating. Quality Plating 
fully informed Mr. Albert as follows: "The claims for temporary total compensation and 
medical expenses and permanent partial compensation are also denied on the grounds that 
these claims are barred by the provisions of Utah Code Ann. Section 34A-2-417. This statute 
is hereby asserted by way of affirmative defense to Petitioner's claims for benefits herein." 
Barnard & Burk even made specific reference to Quality Plating in its answer. Indeed, 
Barnard & Burk identified and moved to join Quality Plating as a necessary party. 
Based upon these undisputed facts, Mr. Albert was fully informed of the nature of the 
2 
defense.1 To conclude otherwise would be to reject the rule that Utah administrative 
pleadings are liberally construed and the principle that as long as a party to an administrative 
proceeding is reasonably apprised of the issues in controversy, the administrative pleading 
is sufficient. Pilcher, 663 P.2d at 453. The Labor Commission, however, prohibited Barnard 
& Burk from relying on the defense and held that Barnard & Burk waived the defense 
because it was not pleaded with specificity and particularity. This interpretation and 
application of the administrative rule is contrary to Utah law. For this reason alone, the 
Labor Commission's decision should be reversed. 
B. The Labor Commission's Misinterpretation and Misapplication of its 
Administrative Rule to Require Strict Pleading of the Affirmative Defense 
Conflicts with Utah Common Law and the Utah Administrative 
Procedures Act. 
Instead of addressing the improper interpretation and application of the administrative 
rule in this case, the Labor Commission focuses its argument on specificity in pleading in the 
abstract, ignoring the core issue of whether the Petitioner was fully informed as required by 
Utah law as articulated above. In its attempt to deflect attention away from this core issue, 
the Commission claims as an initial argument that Barnard & Burk failed to preserve for 
appeal the point that the Commission improperly interpreted and applied Rule R602-2-1.D 
1
 Moreover, as is discussed in detail in Barnard & Burk's opening brief, Mr. Albert could 
not have been misled into thinking that any section other than Section 34A-2-417 applied. This 
is because of the limited number of statutes of limitations found in the Worker's Compensation 
Act, and the Labor Commission erred in failing to apply the liberal administrative pleading 
standard which is essential for resolution of administrative disputes in determining the statute's 
application. 
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contrary to Utah law and the Utah Administrative Procedures Act. 
1. Whether Rule 602-2-l.D is Contrary to Utah Law is Properly 
Before this Court 
The Labor Commission erroneously insists this issue, whether the Commission 
erroneously interpreted and applied Rule R602-2-1.D contrary to Utah law, was not 
adequately preserved for review in the administrative proceeding. To the contrary, in its 
Motion for Review to the Appeals Board, Barnard & Burk argued that the manner in which 
the Commission interpreted and applied Rule R602-2-1.D was contrary to Utah law. 
In its Motion for Review, Barnard & Burk challenged the Commission's interpretation 
and application of Rule R602-2-1JD, arguing in detail in its reply brief how Barnard & Burk 
had complied with Rule R602-2-1.D. Barnard & Burk articulated why the Labor 
Commission's requirement to plead with specificity was 'not supportable under Utah civil 
and administrative rules, as well as principles of notice pleading which serve as the 
foundation of such rules." (R. 00692, Ex. P to Opening Brief.) Barnard & Burk provided 
authority from Utah cases for the liberal notice pleading standard and explained why the AL J 
erred. (R. 00693, Ex. P to Opening Brief.) 
The Labor Commission now attempts to claim that the issue was not preserved 
because Barnard & Burk's argument did not expressly refer to the Utah Administrative 
Procedures Act and state that the Commission's erroneous interpretation and application of 
Rule R60202-1 .D was contrary to the Act. According to the Commission, even though the 
applicability of Rule 602-2-l.D . . . was squarely before the Appeals Board . . . Barnard & 
4 
Burk did not suggest that Rule 602-2-1 .D violated [the] UAPA." (Br. of Labor Comm'n at 
p. 10.) To acknowledge that a party "squarely raised" whether an administrative rule was 
improperly applied as contrary to Utah law, only to claim that the issue was not preserved 
because it was not expressly stated that the administrative rule violated the Utah 
Administrative Procedures Act, is disingenuous. The Labor Commission was well aware of 
Barnard & Burk's position that the Labor Commission's interpretation and application of its 
administrative rule was contrary to Utah law.2 
2. The Labor Commission's Interpretation and Application of Rule 
R602-2-1.D is Contrary to the Utah Administrative Procedures Act 
The Labor Commission cannot apply an administrative rule inconsistent with the Utah 
Administrative Procedures Act. See, e.g., Morgan County v. Holnam. Inc.. 2001 UT 57, f 7, 
29 P.3d 629 (quoting SF Phosphates Ltd. Co. v. Auditing Div.. Utah State Tax Comm'n. 972 
P.2d 384, 386 (Utah 1998)): see also Target Trucking v. Labor Comm'n. 2005 UT App 70, 
1f6, P.3d . In the instant case, the Labor Commission's application of Rule R602-2-1 .D 
is inconsistent with the Act. The liberal pleading requirements in both the Act and 
longstanding Utah case law must be given precedence over the administrative rule as 
2
 The Commission's statements regarding exhaustion of administrative remedies are 
misleading. (Br. of Labor Comm'n at 9.) This is because there is no basis for the Commission to 
claim that Barnard & Burk failed to seek administrative relief before it sought judicial review. 
The instant matter is a petition for review of an administrative decision that was reached by the 
Labor Commission following an initial hearing with an administrative law judge, a motion for 
review to the Appeals Board, and a motion for reconsideration to the Appeals Board. Clearly 
administrative channels were exhausted. Accordingly, the Labor Commission's mention of 
failure to exhaust administrative remedies is completely without merit. 
5 
improperly applied by the Labor Commission to require specificity in pleading. 
In addressing this point, the Labor Commission articulates an undisputed issue, 
pointing out that the Utah Legislature has authorized the agency to promulgate administrative 
rules. (Br. of Labor Comm'n at pp. 11-12.) This is undisputed and misleading. The issue 
is not whether the Labor Commission had authority to promulgate Rule R602-2-1 .D. What 
is actually at issue is whether the Labor Commission interpreted and applied its rule contrary 
to Utah law and the Utah Administrative Procedures Act. 
The Utah Administrative Procedures Act sets forth what must be included in a 
responsive pleading in a formal agency proceeding: (1) the agency's file number or other 
reference number, (2) the name of the adjudicative proceeding, (3) a statement of the relief 
that the respondent seeks, (4) a statement of the facts, and (5) a statement summarizing the 
reasons that the relief requested should be granted. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46(b)-6(l) (2005). 
The Labor Commission insists that "the statute does not prohibit an administrative agency 
from requiring other elements." (Br. of Labor Comm'n at 12.) While it is true in the abstract 
that an administrative agency may, by rule, govern pleading before it, the Commission cannot 
require other elements and expand what must be included in an administrative pleading that 
results in a strict pleading standard. In other words, the Commission cannot require 
additional pleading elements if the result is to overrun the liberal pleading standard 
promulgated by Utah courts and the Utah Legislature in favor of a purported strict pleading 
standard. To apply an administrative rule in this way would be inconsistent with the Utah 
6 
Administrative Procedures Act, and constitutes reversible error. See. Morgan County. 2001 
UT57atf7,29P.3d629. 
In this case, the Labor Commission's interpretation of Rule R602-2-1.D imposed 
additional pleading requirements and a strict pleading standard. The section of the Utah 
Administrative Procedures Act that sets forth the responsive pleading requirements reads as 
follows: 
(1) In all formal adjudicative proceedings, unless modified by rule according 
to Subsection 63-46b-3(5), the respondent, if any, shall file and serve a written 
response signed by the respondent or the respondent's representative within 30 
days of the mailing date or last date of publication of the notice of agency 
action or the notice under Subsection 63-46b-3(3)(d), which shall include: 
(a) the agency's file number or other reference number; 
(b) the name of the adjudicative proceeding; 
(c) a statement of the relief that the respondent seeks; 
(d) a statement of the facts; and 
(e) a statement summarizing the reasons that the relief requested 
should be granted. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46(b)-6(l) (2005). An agency cannot impose stricter standards that 
would contradict Utah law and the UAPA. For example, Subsection 63-46b-3(5) permits an 
agency to "by rule, provide for a longer response time." Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-3(5) 
(2005) (noting discretion only for a longer response time, and that a shorter response time 
may only be pursuant to federal law).3 In other words, an agency may liberalize the response 
time requirement by rule, but it cannot make it shorter or more strict than the time permitted 
3 
Subsection 5 reads as follows: "(5) For designated classes of adjudicative proceedings, 
an agency may, by rule, provide for a longer response time than allowed by this section, and may 
provide for a shorter response time if required or permitted by applicable federal law." 
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by statute. This is analogous to the issue before the court:. 
The Labor Commission's interpretation and application of Rule R602-2-1.D is 
contrary to Utah law and the UAPA because it purports to require a stricter pleading 
requirement than the liberalized standard of Utah law and the UAPA. The Labor 
Commission can promulgate rules that relate to administrative pleadings, but it may not 
interpret or apply those rules to impose more strict pleading requirements than those set forth 
by Utah appellate courts or the Legislature. Because the Labor Commission interpreted its 
rule to impose a strict pleading requirement contrary to Utah case law and statute by 
requiring Barnard & Burk to plead the defense of Utah Code Section 34A-2-417 by 
subsection, Barnard & Burk is entitled to relief pursuant to Utah Code Section 63-46b-
16(4)(d). 
II. The Labor Commission Misinterpreted and Misapplied its Own Administrative 
Rule R602-2-1.D 
The Labor Commission also erred when it applied its own administrative rule, Rule 
R60202-1.D, to require Barnard & Burk to plead its statute of limitations defense with 
specificity. Rule R602-2-1.D directs that administrative pleadings must be interpreted 
liberally, and if a Petitioner is fully informed of the nature of an affirmative defense, the 
affirmative defense is adequately raised. Barnard & Burk's affirmative defense was 
adequately raised because Petitioner was fully informed of the nature of the defense. The 
Labor Commission erred in failing to properly interpret and apply the rule. 
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The Labor Commission focuses on the undisputed principle that affirmative defenses 
are waived if not properly raised. (Br. of Labor Comm'n at p. 13.) For example, in its 
statement of facts, the Commission emphasizes that the Commission's Request for Answer 
"advised each employer/insurance carrier that c(f)ailure to set forth any affirmative 
defense(s) may preclude your raising such defense(s) at the hearing," (Br. of Labor 
Comm'n at p.5 (Emphasis in original)). The Commission also claims that Barnard & Burk's 
"arguments overlook the principle that affirmative defenses not raised are waived." (Br. of 
Labor Comm'n at p. 14.) This argument mischaracterizes what is at issue. Barnard & Burk 
does not overlook this principle; Barnard & Burk does dispute that affirmative defenses are 
waived if they are not adequately raised. Instead, Barnard & Burk contends its defenses were 
adequately raised. In other words, the issue is not whether or not affirmative defenses are 
waived if not properly raised, but whether Barnard & Burk adequately raised the affirmative 
defense of Section 34A-2-417. 
The affirmative defense of Section 34A-2-417 was adequately raised by Barnard & 
Burk because the Petitioner was fully informed of the nature of the defense asserted. 
Contrary to the Labor Commission's argument, the Rule does not require administrative 
pleading with specificity. In fact, the Labor Commission's interpretation of Rule R602-2-1 .D 
is contrary to the plain language and meaning of the rule, and it is also contrary to 
administrative policy and common sense as adopted in the well-established rule of liberality 
in administrative pleadings. 
9 
A. Plain Meaning: Mr. Albert was "Fully Informed of the Nature of the 
Defense Asserted" 
Administrative rules are construed according to their plain meaning. Archer v. Board 
of State Lands and Forestry. 907 P.2d 1142, 1145-46 (Utah 1995). The plain language of 
Rule R602-2-1.D states that for an answer to be adequate, the claimant must be "fully 
informed of the nature of the defense asserted." The plain language makes no mention of 
technical pleading requirements. 
The version of Rule R602-2-1 .D in effect at the time Barnard & Burk filed its Answer 
reads, in relevant part, as follows: "The answer shall state all affirmative defenses with 
sufficient accuracy and detail that an applicant may be fully informed of the nature of the 
defense asserted." Utah Admin. Code R602-2-1.D. (2003). 
The Labor Commission improperly focuses on only the first clause of its 
administrative rule: "The answer shall state all affirmative defenses with sufficient accuracy 
and detail." The Commission errs in failing to address, much less focus on, the second 
clause. The second clause modifies the first and specifies to what extent affirmative defenses 
must be stated. Affirmative defenses must be stated "with sufficient accuracy and detail that 
an applicant may be fully informed of the nature of the defense asserted." Utah Admin. 
Code R602-2-1.D. (2003) (emphasis added.) In interpreting rules, the Commission must 
attempt to harmonize and give meaning to each clause and word. The Labor Commission 
failed to do this in this case because the Commission disregarded the critical second clause. 
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In it's order, the Labor Commission Appeals Board insisted that affirmative defenses 
must be pleaded with specificity. Instead of considering whether the applicant, Mr. Albert, 
was fully informed of the nature of the statute of limitations defense, the Appeals Board's 
order states that it evaluated whether Barnard & Burk "properly raised" the defense "with 
sufficient accuracy and detail." (R. 00699-00700) This focuses on the first clause of the rule 
to the exclusion of the second. A complete analysis would consider not just the nature of the 
pleading, but whether the petitioner was "fully informed of the nature of the defense." In 
other words, had the Commission given credence to the second clause, it would have 
evaluated whether Petitioner Johnny Albert was fully informed of the nature of the defense, 
not just whether one party's pleading was less clear than another's. 
The Labor Commission's brief also reflects this incomplete analysis and incomplete 
focus on only the first clause. The Commission's brief notes that the Appeals Board 
"contrasted the clarity with which another respondent (Quality) had pled its §417 defenses 
with the vagueness of Barnard & Burk's answer." (Br. of Labor Comm'n at pp. 13-14.) A 
complete analysis would address whether the petitioner was fully informed of the defense, 
not on whether one pleading was more clear than another. 
Indeed, analyzing the plain language of the rule and the facts and circumstances 
surrounding Barnard & Burk's answer, Mr. Albert was folly informed of the nature of the 
statute of limitations defense. In pleading the affirmative defense, Barnard & Burk stated 
as follows: "Defendants affirmatively allege the applicant's claims are or may be barred or 
11 
limited by the statutes of limitation and/or notice provisions contained in Utah Code 
Annotated § 34A-2 et seq., § 34A-3 et seq. and § 35-1 et seq." Barnard & Burk raised this 
defense seven months after co-defendant Quality Plating had, as the Commission points out, 
raised the same affirmative defense with "clarity," pleading as follows: "The claims for 
temporary total compensation and medical expenses and permanent partial compensation are 
also denied on the grounds that these claims are barred by the provisions of Utah Code Ann. 
Section 34A-2-417. This statute is hereby asserted by way of affirmative defense to 
Petitioner's claims for benefits herein." 
Given these two pleadings, Petitioner cannot legitimately claim he was unaware of the 
nature of the affirmative defense. Moreover, the Labor Commission's brief virtually 
acknowledges that Petitioner had to have been fully aware of the nature of the defense when, 
seven months before Barnard & Burk raised the defense, he received Quality Plating's 
answer in which the defense was pleaded with "clarity."4 As a result, the Labor 
Commission's application of the administrative rule and conclusion that Petitioner Albert 
was not fully informed of the nature of the defense was erroneous. 
4
 Additionally, as is explained in Section V, infra, Petitioner Albert was made fully aware 
of the nature of the defense of Section 34A-2-417 when Barnard & Burk presented the only 
record evidence of any medical expenses incurred and submitted by Johnny Albert to Barnard & 
Burk that had already been paid by Barnard & Burk. 
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B. Administrative Policy and Common Sense 
Administrative pleadings must also be construed "consistent with good policy and 
common sense." Archer. 907 P.2d at 1145-46; see also Pilcher. 663 P.2d at 453 
("administrative pleadings are to be liberally construed.") Administrative policy and 
common sense also demand the conclusion that Mr. Albert was on notice of the statutory 
defense. 
As a matter of administrative and judicial policy, Utah administrative proceedings are 
less formal and must be conducted with greater flexibility than judicial proceedings, and rigid 
adherence to technical requirements in administrative proceedings is inappropriate. Archer. 
907 P.2d at 1145-46; Pilcher. 663 P.2d at 453. This focus away from technical pleading 
requirements requires an evaluation of whether the opposing party was informed of the 
defense, not on the technical aspects in which the defense was pleaded. 
Considering the facts and circumstances in this light, Mr. Albert was "fully informed 
of the nature of the defense asserted": Barnard & Burk raised the statute of limitations 
generally in its seventh affirmative defense; Quality Plating raised the statue of limitations 
specifically seven months before Barnard & Burk filed its Answer, and Barnard & Burk's 
Answer referenced and moved to join Quality Plating as a necessary party. Petitioner cannot 
legitimately claim that he was unaware of the nature of the defense. Failure by the Labor 
Commission to so conclude was contrary to Utah administrative policy. 
13 
III. The Labor Commission Acted Arbitrarily and Capriciously which Requires 
Reversal Based Upon Utah Code Section 63-46b-16(4)(h)(iv) 
The Labor Commission attempts to couch the issue of its arbitrary and capricious 
decision as simply whether its application of Rule R602-2-1.D. was "contrary to appellate 
precedent and other general law." (Br. of Labor Comm'n at p.3.) The Labor Commission 
also alleges that the Appeal's Board's decision was "within the bounds of reasonableness and 
rationality." (Br. ofLaborComm'natp.13.) This mischaracterizes the issue. The question 
is whether the Labor Commission acted arbitrarily and capriciously, a violation of Utah Code 
Section 63-46b-16(4)(h)(iv) which mandates reversal. See Utah Code Section 63-46b-
16(4)(h)(iv) ("The appellate court shall grant relief i f . . . (h) the agency action is: (iv) 
otherwise arbitrary or capricious"). 
As a preliminary matter, the Labor commission strenuously asserts that a critical 
determination is whether "this proceeding is controlled by Rule 602-2-l.D." This is 
misleading. Whether Rule R602-2-1 .D is applicable in this case is not at issue. Defendants 
do not dispute that Rule 602-2-l.D applies to administrative proceedings, including the 
administrative proceedings in this case.5 What is at issue is the interpretation and application 
of this rule by the Labor Commission. In other words, the real problem is not whether Rule 
R602-2-1 .D. is applicable, but whether the Commission improperly interpreted and applied 
5
 To the extent the Labor Commission asserts that the appellate proceeding before this 
court is controlled by Rule 602-2-l.D., Defendants disagree. The administrative rules are 
applicable in administrative proceedings, not judicial proceedings. The administrative rule was 
applicable in the administrative arena, but misinterpreted and misapplied by the Commission. 
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the rule to the facts of this case. 
The Labor Commission improperly interpreted and applied Rule R602-2-1.D to 
require affirmative defenses to be pleaded technically and with specificity. In pleading the 
statute of limitations and notice provisions of the Worker's Compensation Act as an 
affirmative defense, Barnard & Burk stated as follows: "Defendants affirmatively allege the 
applicant's claims are or may be barred or limited by the statutes of limitation and/or notice 
provisions contained in Utah Code Annotated § 34A-2 et seq., § 34A-3 et seq. and § 35-1 et 
seq." Barnard & Burk raised this defense seven months after co-defendant Quality Plating 
had raised the same affirmative defense in its answer, pleading as follows: "The claims for 
temporary total compensation and medical expenses and permanent partial compensation are 
also denied on the grounds that these claims are barred by the provisions of Utah Code Ann. 
Section 34A-2-417. This statute is hereby asserted by way of affirmative defense to 
Petitioner's claims for benefits herein." 
As noted previously, despite these facts and circumstances, the Labor Commission 
precluded Barnard & Burk from relying on the defense. The Labor Commission concluded 
that because Barnard & Burk did not identify the statute with the same precision that Quality 
Plating did, irrespective of the fact that Quality Plating raised the defense seven months prior, 
Petitioner was not fully informed of the nature of the defense. 
Outlined below are three reasons why this Labor Commission's interpretation and 
application of Rule R602-2-1 .D to impose a technical pleading requirement was arbitrary and 
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capricious. Because the Commission acted arbitrarily zmd capriciously, this Court must 
reverse the Commission's Order pursuant to Utah Code Section 63-46b-16(4)(h)(iv). 
First, the Labor Commission acted arbitrarily and capriciously because it 
misinterpreted and misapplied Administrative Rule R602-2-1.D contrary to Utah statute. 
In insisting that Rule 602-2-1 .D is determinative, the Labor Commission suggests that Rule 
602-2-1 .D carries more weight than Utah statutes or decisions by Utah appellate courts. This 
is simply not the case. The rules of any administrative agency are subordinate to precedent 
from Utah courts and the Utah Administrative Procedures Act. Morgan County. 2001 UT 
57 at [^7, 29 P.3d 629. As explained previously, administrative rule R602-2-1 .D cannot be 
interpreted or applied to impose a stricter pleading requirement than Utah Code Section §63-
46b-6. The Labor Commission cannot impose pleading requirements that are more strict than 
the statutory requirements set forth by the Legislature because to do so would usurp 
legislative authority and run contrary to law on the liberality in administrative pleading and 
contrary to longstanding public policy goal of administrative proceedings reaching informal, 
efficient resolutions. 
Second, the Labor Commission has acted arbitrarily and capriciously in disregarding 
long-established Utah law on the liberality of administrative pleadings. An administrative 
rule cannot be interpreted and applied contrary to decisions by Utah appellate courts. It is 
arbitrary and capricious conduct for the Commission to reject case law from Utah appellate 
courts in favor of its own technical interpretation and improper application of its own 
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administrative rule to require affirmative defenses to be pleaded with specificity. 
Petitioner claims that apart from the argument that Utah Code Section 63-46b-6(l) 
supercedes the administrative rule, Defendants do not identify any "law or precedent that 
supercedes the application of Rule R602-2-1 .D." (Br. of Labor Comm'n at p. 16.) First, as 
explained previously, Utah Code Section 63-46b-6( 1) does supercede Rule R602-2-1 .D. See 
Morgan County. 2001 UT 57 at | 7 , 29 P.3d 629 (holding that administrative rules are 
subordinate to the Utah Administrative Procedures Act). Second, Defendants have, in fact, 
cited and fully analyzed Utah precedent regarding the liberal standard of administrative 
pleading that supercedes the Commission's erroneous technical application of Rule R602-2-
l.D. See Morgan County. 2001 UT 57 at f7, 29 P.3d 629; Pilcher. 663 P.2d at 
453(explaining that Utah administrative pleadings are liberally construed and that 
administrative proceedings are to be conducted with greater flexibility and informality than 
judicial proceedings); see also Attorney General of Utah v.Pomeroy. 73 P.2d 1277, 1299-
1300 (Utah 1937) (rejecting argument in an administrative proceeding that statute of 
limitation was not properly pleaded because specific subsection was not set forth). The 
Commission's application of strict pleading requirements are contrary to Utah law on 
liberality in administrative pleading and contrary to the administrative role of achieving 
informal, efficient resolutions. 
Third, the Labor Commission has also acted arbitrarily and capriciously in failing to 
consistently apply its own rules. The Labor Commission fails to address this issue; nowhere 
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in its brief does the Commission explain its internal inconsistency in applying the proper 
liberal pleading standard. In other matters before it, the Labor Commission has expressly 
stated that pleading rules are liberal and that the Commission will not adhere to strict, 
technical pleading rules. As Barnard & Burk pointed out in its initial brief, the Labor 
Commission Appeals Board stated as follows in Labor Commission case No. 00-0047, a case 
that also involved defense counsel in the instant case: "[Tjhe Appeals Board is unwilling to 
impose technical pleading rules in workers' compensation cases which, by their very nature, 
are intended to be informal and to focus on substance over form." (See Order, Ex. F to 
Opening Brief, p.6.) In this case, however, the Commission concluded that Barnard & 
Burk's answer "did not 'state all affirmative defenses with sufficient accuracy and detail that 
an applicant may be fully informed of the nature of the defense asserted,' as required by the 
Commission's Rule 602-2-1.D." (R. 00850.) This decision is arbitrary and capricious. 
The Labor Commission states that its own decisions in other cases "are not 
comparable or relevant to the Board's action in this case." This statement is a vain attempt 
to avoid addressing in full the Labor Commission's arbitrary and capricious conduct. 
Certainly the Labor Commission's own decisions are not controlling, and other cases before 
the Commission certainly do not involve identical facts and circumstances as this case. Other 
matters before the Commission are certainly comparable, however, and they are relevant to 
whether the Commission's decision in this case was arbitrary or capricious. The Labor 
Commission articulated the liberal pleading standard in other cases, and the fact that the 
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Labor Commission has applied the proper liberal pleading standard in other cases, only to 
apply a strict pleading standard in this one, is a reflection that Commission's decision in this 
case was arbitrary and capricious. 
Touting liberal pleading rules in one case only to disregard them in another is 
undeniably arbitrary and capricious conduct. This court should instruct the Labor 
Commission that it may not choose to apply the liberal pleading standard in some 
circumstances and not others. The Labor Commission should not be permitted to use the 
liberal pleading standard in some circumstances to reach a particular decision in one case, 
and then apply a technical pleading requirement in another case to reach another outcome-
determinative decision. In sum, the Labor Commission acts arbitrarily and capriciously when 
it adheres to strict pleading requirements in some circumstances, and then relaxes them in 
others. The Labor Commission must be admonished that it must apply the liberal pleading 
standard evenly and consistently, all the time, instead of at selected times. 
To summarize, the Labor Commission acted arbitrarily and capriciously in this case 
contrary to Utah Code Section 63-46b-16(4)(h)(iv) in the following ways: (1) it 
misinterpreted and misapplied its own administrative rule contrary to Utah statute, (2) it 
misinterpreted and misapplied its own administrative rule contrary to longstanding Utah case 
law, and (3) it misinterpreted and misapplied its own administrative rule contrary to its own 
prior decisions. As a result, Barnard & Burk should be granted relief pursuant to Section 63-
46b-16(4)(h)(iv). 
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IV. The Labor Commission's Order is an Improper Open-Ended Award of Future 
Medical Expenses 
The Labor Commission's Order must be reversed because the Commission's open-
ended order of future medical expenses is improper under Utah law and not supported by any 
findings of fact. The Labor Commission admits that the ALJ's decision purports to hold that 
Barnard & Burk is responsible for indefinite medical expenses. The Commission now argues 
that such an open-ended award of future medical expenses is acceptable. Defendants, on the 
other hand, argue that the Commission erred because it permitted an open-ended award, 
which is contrary to Utah law, and failed to determine a definite amount of medical expenses 
to be paid. For the reasons that follow, the authority cited by the Labor Commission holds 
that the Commission's open-ended award of medical expenses is improper and must be 
reversed. 
The Labor Commission cites U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Indus. Comm'n. 657 P.2d 
764 (Utah 1983) (hereafter "U.S.F.&G."), for the proposition that an employer's obligation 
to an injured employee continues indefinitely. (See Br. of Labor Comm'n at pp. 16-17.) This 
is not the holding of U.S.F. & G.. however. To the contrary, U.S.F.&G. holds, inter alia, as 
follows: "An open ended award of future expenses is improper. Future expenses should 
only be awarded as they arise and upon proper application to and investigation by the 
Commission pursuant to §§ 35-1-81 and35-l-78." IdLat769. In passing, the court mentions 
that an employer's obligation to pay an employee's ongoing medical expenses may continue 
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indefinitely. However, the court then goes to great lengths to explain that open-ended awards 
of future medical expenses are improper, and to explain how future medical expenses are 
determined and awarded; specifically how the Commission retains control and supervision 
over future applications for future medical expenses, but that the Commission must 
determine in future proceedings that such future medical expenses are causally related to the 
accident before an award may issue. Id. at 765-69. 
In U.S.F.& G., the Industrial Commission apportioned "all past, present, and future 
medical expenses" between two insurance carriers for an industrial accident. Id. at 765-66. 
On appeal, U.S.F.&G. argued that it had already paid the medical expenses attributable to the 
accident, and it insisted it should not have an undetermined, indefinite obligation. In 
addressing this point, the court discussed the application of Utah Construction Co. v. 
Matheson, 534 P.2d 1238 (Utah 1975), in which the employer also argued "that an order to 
pay medical expenses should not be a 'blank check5 to the injured, by which he could 
continue [to collect money for medical services] indefinitely." Id. at 768 (construing 
Matheson). The U.S.F.&G. court agreed that open-ended awards of future medical expenses 
were improper "blank checks." In reaching this conclusion, the court explained that 
applications for future medical expenses remained subject to the "supervision and control" 
of the Commission, but that before any future medical expenses could be awarded, a 
petitioner would have to make application and demonstrate that the medical expenses were 
both reasonably necessary and causally linked to the industrial accident. Id. In other words, 
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for future medical expenses, a petitioner has to make "proper application" to the 
Commission as disputed future medical expenses arise, and obtain a determination from the 
Commission that the future medical expenses are causally linked to the industrial accident. 
In short, "[a]n open ended award of future expenses" is improper. Id at 769; see also 
Matheson. 534 P.2d at 1239-40 (discussing how the Commission may adjudicate past and 
present medical expenses, but that for future medical expenses, the Commission retains 
supervision and control over future medical expenses applications and must make future 
determinations of a causal link before future medical expenses may be awarded).6 
Applied to this case, U.S.F.&G. supports reversal because the Labor Commission's 
open ended award of future medical expenses was improper. Should future medical expenses 
arise for Petitioner Johnny Albert, he must make application to the Commission, and the 
Commission must then determine whether the future medical expenses he seeks 
compensation for are causally related to the industrial accident, and not an unrelated injury.7 
6
 An open ended award is improper because it is not supported by any findings of fact. 
As noted by Barnard & Burk in its opening brief, an order issued by an administrative agency 
must be consistent with its findings of fact, and if the agency's order is not supported by findings 
of fact, it must be corrected by an appellate court. See, e.g.. Parowan Pumpers Ass'n v. Public 
Service Common. 586 P.2d 407, 408-09 (Utah 1978). Because the Labor Commission's open-
ended order is not supported by any findings of future medical expenses, it is inconsistent and 
must be corrected by this Court. See idL Additionally, the Labor Commission did not identify or 
award any past medical expenses owed by Barnard & Burk. (R. 526.) 
7
 The only medical expenses that could be awarded in this case are those which have 
been submitted by Petitioner and which the Industrial Commission has determined are causally 
linked to the industrial accident. Had the Commission's Findings of Fact contained a proper 
finding, it would have been the amount of $149.57 which were already paid. This is because the 
only evidence of medical expenses owed by Barnard & Burk due to the January 28, 1991 
accident are two chiropractic visits that total $149.57. (R. 00835 at 92: 3-25; 93:1-23) The 
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Indeed, the Worker's Compensation statute interpreted by U.S.F.& G and Matheson is the 
same statute in effect at the time of the accident in the instant case, and therefore U.S.F.&G. 
andMathesonare controlling authority.8 Accordingly, the Commission's open-ended award 
of future medical expenses is improper and must be reversed. 
V. Mr. Albert had a Full and Fair Hearing at Which he Had Ample Opportunity 
to Address the Statute of Limitations Issue 
Barnard & Burk is also entitled to relief because any inadequacies in pleading were 
cured because a full and fair administrative hearing was held. The Labor Commission does 
not respond to this point. 
In Utah administrative proceedings, "Proof may depart from pleadings and pleadings 
may be amended to conform to proof if undue surprise is avoided." 3 Kenneth Culp Davis, 
Administrative Law Treatise § 14:11 at 47 (2d ed. 1980), quoted in Pilcher. 663 P.2d at 453. 
Other states agree that an administrative pleading is sufficient if the "respondent understood 
the issue and was afforded full opportunity to justify its conduct during the course of the 
[administrative process]." Perry v. Planning Comm'n of the County of Hawaii, 619 P.2d 95, 
108 (Haw. 1980). 
Labor Commission's Findings of Fact in this case, however, do not contain a finding that the 
medical expenses incurred and submitted by Mr. Albert are causally related to the January 28, 
1991 accident. Instead of making a finding that the medical expenses submitted by Petitioner 
were causally related to the accident, the Labor Commission erroneously issued an open-ended 
order for all future medical expenses. As explained above, such an open-ended award is 
improper. 
8
 The current statute is also substantively the same. See Utah Code Ann. §§35-1-78 
(1991); 35-1-81 (1991) (statutes in effect in 1991); and Utah Code Ann. §§ 34A-2-418 (2005); 
34A-2-420 (2005) (current statutes). 
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Mr. Albert had a full and fair hearing. Mr. Albert and his counsel understood the 
statute of limitations issue that was raised by Barnard & Burk and Quality Plating, and the 
implication that he had to produce evidence of medical expenses at the hearing in order to 
be compensated for them. Petitioner Albert was necessarily aware of Section 34A-2-417 
when Barnard & Burk presented the only record evidence of any medical expenses that were 
incurred and submitted by Johnny Albert to Barnard & Burk. Mr. Albert had ample 
opportunity to present any other evidence of his incurred medical expenses as required by 
Section 34A-2-417 during the administrative hearing, and he even consented to the 
introduction of evidence regarding his medical expenses relating to the January 28, 1991 
accident by opposing counsel. (R. 00835 at 92: 3-25; 93:1-23) 
In sum, even assuming any inadequacies in pleading, these were cured because a full 
and fair administrative hearing was held. 
CONCLUSION 
This court should set aside the Labor Commission's decision and dismiss Barnard & 
Burk pursuant to the statute of limitations defense. 
First, the Labor Commission's interpretation and application of Rule R6020201 .D to 
impose a strict pleading requirement is contrary to Utah law as set forth by both Utah courts 
and the Utah Administrative Procedures Act. 
Second, the Labor Commission misinterpreted and misapplied its own administrative 
rule because Petitioner Albert was fully informed of the nature of the statutory defense. This 
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is because both Barnard & Burk and Quality Plating raised the defense, and the Commission 
even admits that Quality Plating "clearly" raised the defense. 
Third, the Labor Commission acted arbitrarily and capriciously contrary to Utah Code 
Section 63-46b-16(4). This is because the Commission required Barnard & Burk to plead 
its defenses with specificity and particularity, thereby disregarding longstanding Utah law 
on the liberality of administrative proceedings. The Commission also acted capriciously and 
arbitrarily because its decision is contrary to prior Commission decisions. 
Fourth, the Labor Commission's order of future medical expenses that contains no 
determination of an amount owed is an improper open-ended award of medical expenses. 
Fifth, any inadequacies in pleading by Barnard & Burk were cured because Petitioner 
had a full and fair hearing. 
Accordingly, Barnard & Burk respectfully requests that the Labor Commission's 
decision be set aside, and that Barnard & Burk be dismissed for the same reason Quality 
Plating was dismissed. Like Quality Plating, Barnard & Burk is entitled to the same statute 
of limitations defense found in Utah Code Section 34A-2-417. 
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